Modal Intensionalism. (2015). JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY.
We sometimes say things like this: “being an animal is part of being a dog.” We associate the part with a precondition for exemplifying the whole. A new semantics for modal logic results when we take this way of speaking seriously. We need not treat necessary truths as truths in all possible worlds. Instead, we may treat them as preconditions for the existence of any world at all. I present this semantics for modal propositional logic and argue that it operates on a more basic level of modal reality than possible world semantics. PDF, LINK
MODAL Semantics Without Worlds. (2016). PHILOSOPHY Compass.
Over the last half century, possible worlds have bled into almost every area of philosophy. In the metaphysics of modality, for example, philosophers have used possible worlds almost exclusively to illuminate discourse about metaphysical necessity and possibility. But recently, some have grown dissatisfied with possible worlds. Why are horses necessarily mammals? Because the property of being a horse bears a special relationship to the property of being a mammal, they say. Not because every horse is a mammal in every possible world. Some have recently begun to use properties to develop rivals to possible worlds semantics which may someday compare in formal power and capture the different systems of modal logic. In this paper, I do two things. I first offer a quick primer on possible worlds semantics. Then I discuss three rivals and the work they have left to do. PDF, LINK
Logic Through a leIbnizian lens. (In Progress, PDF AVAILABLE BY EMAIL)
I develop a new semantics for first-order logic without individuals as the values of names or extensions as the values of predicates. Compared to the standard semantics for first-order logic, it better reflects the truly intensional meanings of predicates. It also resolves longstanding problems with Leibniz’s conceptual containment theory.
Logic For the morally IDEAL. (in progress)
I develop a new semantics for a new deontic logic.